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development method (d*)
Takuya Saruwatari1* and Shuichiro Yamamoto2Abstract
Now, information systems are developed as open system that depend on each other. Assurance cases are expected
to confirm a dependability of open systems. D*Framework is a method that can make assurance case for open
system. In this paper we defined d*Framework formally. Furthermore we apply this method with case study and
made discussion.
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Dependability support of an information system is becom-
ing difficult as the use of an information system is diversi-
fied and complicated. Recently, The system consisting of
two or more portions is becoming common. We have to
consider dependability of such a system. But this is difficult
because we must consider multi systems simultaneously.
In recent years, creations of Assurance Case are in-
creasing for consideration of management of depend-
ability in systems development Kelly (1999) Sujan et al.
(2007) Scott and Krombolz (2005) Bishop et al. (2004)
Rhdes et al. (2009). In generally, GSN Kelly (1999) (Goal
Structuring Notation), which can structurally arrange
the purpose, has been used for creation of Assurance
Case. In a system development process, creating and
managing Assurance Case become possible by GSN.
However, when two or more systems related each other,
in GSN, it becomes difficult to treat the interaction be-
tween systems explicitly. In order to treat with this prob-
lem, d*Framework (d*) is proposed Yamamoto and
Matsuno (2012). The d* has notion of actors. So that, it
can treat a system that is consist of two or more por-
tions. In that case, it is considered that each portion is
actor. But, the definition of d* has not been given clearly
yet. In this paper, we define the d* explicitly and create
an assurance case as an example of case study using d*.* Correspondence: saruwatari.takuya@e.mbox.nagoya-u.ac.jp
1Graduate School of Information Science, Nagoya University, Chikusa-ku,
Nagoya, Japan
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2013 Saruwatari and Yamamoto; licensee Sp
Commons Attribution License (http://creativeco
reproduction in any medium, provided the origResults and discussion
In this paper, we defined d* formally. And we defined
creation process of d*. That result is shown in method
chapter.
And we created Assurance Case of elevator system
(Figure 1) by using d*. We created whole Assurance
Case of the system and two Assurance Cases of actors.
As a result we obtained dependability information as ac-
tors, goals, strategies, solutions and contexts. Numbers
of element of this result are shown in Table 1. These
numbers are results in a phase in the middle of Assur-
ance Case creation. Whole Assurance Case diagram is
shown in Figure 2. Assurance Case diagram of inner
Actor “Rope” is shown in Figure 3 and Assurance Case
of inner Actor “Cage” is shown in Figure 4. In this ex-
ample “assured average” is 0.4, and “assured variance” is
0.84. “Assured average” and “assured variance” definition
is shown below.
We have few discussions in making Assurance Case.
The discussions are shown in below.Effectiveness
As a case study result, it turned out that prevention of
lack of consideration of dependability information is ex-
pectable. We think that expectation is derived by d* fea-
ture. The reason of that, in d*, dependability information
can be elicited from between actors and can be elicited
from inner actor. We think this double check of depend-
ability information is effective for prevent lack of elicit-
ation. In this meaning, we think that we could not elicit
dependability information by using GSN. Because, whenringer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and









Figure 1 Elevator system configuration.
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over, we think that this feature is effective to a phased
test (e.g. simple substance test and joint test) that is gen-
erally carried out in system development. The accident
of elevator occurred in japan before. Since the basketTable 1 Number of elements
Element Number
Actors 10
Goals Inter Actors 13
Inner Rope 7
Inner Cage 10
Strategies Inter Actors 2
Inner Rope 4
Inner Cage 5
Solutions Inter Actors 3
Inner Rope 3
Inner Cage 1
Contexts Inter Actors 0
Inner Rope 1
Inner Cage 1moved with the door opened, the accident occurred.
Two subsystems were related in this accident, i.e. “Cage”
and “Door” were related with this accident. If assurance
case by d* was created, such an accident might have
been able to been prevented, i.e. the measures to it may
have been taken.
Issues to be resolved
As a result of having applied d*, it became clear that
some issues which should be solved arise.
First issue is that similar goal decomposition is
performed in Inter Analysis and Inner Analysis. It may
seem to have duplicate information. Here, Inter Analysis
and Inner Analysis are two types of analysis in d*. This
is occurred by difficulty of distinguish the aim of analysis
between Inter Analysis and Inner Analysis. However, if it
thinks from a viewpoint of preventing lack of analysis of
dependability information, we think that it will be
thought that this problem is permissible.
Second issue is that diagram of Assurance Case be-
comes too big and complicated. Although it is only an
early stage of the construction of Assurance Case shown
in this paper, it is too big and complicated diagram
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Figure 2 Whole assurance case of elevator system.
Saruwatari and Yamamoto SpringerPlus 2013, 2:224 Page 3 of 8
http://www.springerplus.com/content/2/1/224become much more complicated. So, understanding of
whole assurance case will be very difficult. And progres-
sion of create of the assurance case will be difficult.
Given the full-fledged use, we think that development of
support tools that can solve this issue in the future will
be a challenge. The D-Case editor D-Case editor shown
in related work is expected as a means to conquer this
challenge.Comparison of methods
There are several methods that treat dependability in-
formation. So, we compared five methods (d*, GSN,
i*Framework Yu (1997), SARM, KAOS Dardenne
(1993)) at four points of view. d* and GSN are
method to describe assurance case. i*Framework,
SARM and KAOS are method of requirement engin-
eering. Four points are purpose, application phase,
notation and information between actors. Result of
comparison is shown in Table 2.
Since GSN goal decomposition procedure is used inside
d*, many features have overlapped between GSN and d*.
It differs at the point about description of actor that is thefeature of d*. If you created assurance case by GSN, you
could not separate the information of actors clearly, even
if the system consists of two or more subsystems. KAOS
has same feature, too. So, we described “-” in “information
between actors” cell of Table 2.
The five methods of Table 2 differ in the several
points. Therefore, we think that each method can be
complement mutually. We have to try to consider the
method that is using of several methods simultaneously.Conclusion
In this paper, we defined d* formally. We defined cre-
ation process of d*. And, we created assurance case of
elevator system by using d*. A d* has a feature that cre-
ating assurance case with consideration of actors. It is
thought that this feature is useful to creation of assur-
ance case of the system currently divided into the sub-
system like open system. Furthermore, we compared five
methods by four viewpoints. Five methods are d*, GSN,
i*Framework, SARM and KAOS. These are different in
several points, and are in complement each other. In fu-
ture, we can research the way that was combined with
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Figure 3 Inner actor assurance case of rope.
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evaluate the proposed method by applying it to several
system developments.
Methods
In this paper, we defined d* formally. And we defined
creation process of d*. At first, we explain about an as-
surance case. Then we describe our definition of d*.
Assurance case
A structured assurance case is defined as “a documented
body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid
argument that a specified set of critical claims regarding
a system’s properties are adequately justified for a given
application in a given environment” Scott and Krombolz
(2005). That is, it can be think of a model created for
guarantee dependability of a system. Creation of anassurance case contains aspect of a goal graph creation
of requirements engineering in that a requirement is
treated. However, creation of an assurance case is not
only for requirements analysis. It is used in design
process, making process and operation phase.
GSN is widely used as a notation for Assurance Case.
Especially, there are three features in GSN.
 Definition of Strategy for goal decomposition
 Definition of Solution to the goal of the bottom of
the heap
 Definition of the additional information
(Justification, Assumption, Model, Context) to goals
or Strategies
These features are suitable to describe the argument of
dependability. However, in the model creation by GSN,
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Figure 4 Inner actor assurance case of cage.
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ately Assurance Case of the open system related to mu-
tual. So, in this paper, we use d* which can create
Assurance Case of such an open systems.
d*framework
A d* is devised in order to create an Assurance Case that
took actors into consideration explicitly Yamamoto and
Matsuno (2011). In d*, actor notion is introduced, like
i*Framework which is one of the goal graph notation.
Namely, in d*, two type of dependability information is
considered. One is dependability information that exists
between actors. Another is dependability information ex-
ists inside an actor.
Elements of d*framework
A d* has five elements for describing assurance case. These
are “Actor”, “Goal”, “Strategy”, “Solution”, and “Context”.Actor Actor is an element that constitutes a system.
Goal Goal shows that a system should satisfy. It can be
decomposed into sub goals and sub strategies.
Strategy Strategy explains argument in order to decompose
Goal. It can describe means of decomposition of goal in
strategy element. It can derive sub goals and sub strategies.
Solution Solution is evidence that shows that goal could
be satisfied.
Context Context is external information that goal and
strategy needed.
Definition of d*framework
In this paper, we defined d*Framework formally and ex-
cluded ambiguity. That definition is shown below.
Table 2 Comparison of methods





















Design phase, Design phase,
Making phase, Making phase,
Test phase, Test phase,
Operation phase Operation phase
Notation Diagram Diagram Diagram Table Diagram
Information
between Actors
It can define goals between
Actors, and can analyze
of them.
- It can define goals, tasks,
resources, soft-goals
between Actors.
It can define goals, tasks,
resources, soft-goals
between Actors, and can
analyze of them.
-
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G, St, Sn, C, Rs, Rc, Rd, Rb > are consist of 9-tuples. A : actor
set, G : goal set, St : strategy set, Sn : solution set, C : context
set, Rs (G∪St) × (G∪St∪Sn) : supported by relationship set,
Rc (G∪St) ×C : in context of relationship set, Rd
(A∪{*}) ×G× (A∪{*}) : depend on relationship set, Rb
(G∪St∪Sn∪C) ×A : belong to relationship set.
Each tuple has below meaning.
 A : Set of Actors.
 G : Set of Goals. Defined inside actor shows that
actor shall satisfy it. Defined between actors show
that each actor agreed it.
 St : Set of strategies.
 So : Set of Solutions (Evidences).
 C : Set of contexts.
 Rs : Set of relationships between lower element
(goal, strategy, solution) and upper elements. In this
relationship lower elements assure upper elements.
That is, upper element is decomposed to lower
elements. There is transitive law in this relationship.
 Rc : Set of relationships between context and
element (goal, strategy).
 Rd : Set of relationships between actors through
goal. If one actor is undefined yet, undefined actor is
described by “*”. Such a relationship is called “open
depend on relationship”.
 Rb : Set of relationships between element (Goal,
Strategy, Solution, Context) and actor. In this
relationship the element belongs to the actor. This
relationship is a mapping from subset of element set
to actor set.
[Def2] Smallest depend on relationship This relation-
ship is derived by “open depend on relationship” and
transitive law of “supported by” relationship. When there
are “open depend on relationships” (<a, b, *>, <*, c, d>)and “supported by relationship” (<b, c>), relationships
(<a, b, d>, <a, c, d>) are derived as “smallest depend on
relationship”. This relationship should not be “open de-
pend on relationship”.
[Def3] Extended depend on relationship set This is a
set of relationship that is “depend on relationship”.
When there are actor A and actor B, all “depend on rela-
tionships” between A and B are included in this set.
[Def4] Equivalence of d* graphs When each elements
of two d* graphs are equal, it is defined that two d*
graphs are equivalence.
[Def5] Containment of d* graphs When there are two
d* graphs DF1 and DF2. If all elements of DF1 are con-
tainment of elements of DF2, it is defined that DF1 is
containment of DF2.
[Def6] Direct assured goal When goal G belongs to
actor and is only assured by solutions (isn’t assured by
other goals), it is defined that G is “direct assured goal
(DAG)”.
[Def7] Assured average Sum of DAG number of each
actor is “assured number (AN)” of that actor. Average of
AN of all actors of d* graph is defined as “assured aver-
age (AA)”.
“Assured average” is considered as an indicator that
shows a size of obligation of each actor. If assured aver-
age is big, recruitment of new actor can be considered
and redistribution of DAG.
[Def8] Assured variance Variance of AN of all actors of
d* graph is defined as “assured variance” of that d* graph.
“Assured variance” is considered as an indicator that
shows a deviation of obligation of each actor. If assured
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has assured the whole assurance case. Maybe, redistribu-
tion of DAG may be needed.Creation process of d*framework
Creation Process of d* is consist of four procedure. Each
procedure is repeated mutually (Figure 5). In this
creation process, creating assurance case of d* is begun
at actor elicitation procedure. Explanation of four
procedures is shown below.Actor elicitation
In this procedure, actors in a system are elicited. In the
early stage of Assurance Case creation, it is elicited using
the computer system configuration diagram, etc. In the
stage in the middle of creation, it may be elicited as a re-
sult of an Inter Analysis procedure or an Inner Analysis
procedure.Dependability elicitation
In this procedure, dependability information (goal) be-
tween actors is elicited.Inter analysis
In d*, dependability information between actors is ana-
lyzed using GSN. Analyzing to dependability information
between actors is processed in this procedure. If goal that
is assured single actor is elicited, Actor Elicitation proced-
ure or Inner Analysis procedure must be processed.
Namely, if the actor already existed in the assurance case,
Inner Analysis procedure must be processed.Actor Elicitation
Inner Analysis
Start
Figure 5 Creation process of d*.Inner analysis
In d*, inside of actor is analyzed using GSN. If there is
dependability information that is dependent from
other actors to this actor, the dependability informa-
tion must be satisfied in the actor. If goal depending
on other actors from a target actor is elicited, it pro-
gresses to an Actor Elicitation procedure or Inter Ana-
lysis procedure.
Related works
In recent years, many researches related to assurance
case are done Kelly (1999) Sujan et al. (2007) Scott and
Krombolz (2005) Bishop et al. (2004) Rhdes et al. (2009).
A context notation of GSN is introduced in a research
Kelly (1999). It also proposed notation for describing
GSN patterns. Case study of assurance case creation is
also carried out. For instance, there was a case study of
the assurance case creation in the medical field Sujan
et al. (2007). In these researches, GSN was used for cre-
ating assurance case. Creation of Assurance Case using
GSN is not taking into consideration actor that is a sub-
system as detailed unit in a system, etc. A d* that is used
in this paper has actor notion. So, it can describe subsys-
tem’s dependability information separately. And it can
describe dependability information related to two or
more subsystems.
In the requirements engineering, analytical methods in
consideration of actors, such as i* Yu (1997) and SARM,
are proposed. Moreover, also in UML (Unified Modeling
Language), actor is taken into consideration by the use
case diagram etc. These methods are used in requirement
phase or modeling phase. It is different that d* used in all
phase of system constructed.Dependability 
Elicitation
Inter Analysis
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In order to support creation of dependability case, the
D-Case editor is developed D-Case editor. In D-Case
editor, an assurance case is created using extended nota-
tion of GSN. Development of the editor for supporting
creation of d* is expected.
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